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Abstract
Being Kenyan Being Muslim (BKBM) is an intervention that counters
violent extremism and other forms of intergroup conflict through
promoting value complexity. BKBM was trialled in Eastleigh, Nairobi,
Kenya with a group of twenty-four participants of Kenyan and Somali
ethnicities; eight participants were identified as vulnerable to extremism,
six of these were former al Shabaab members. This article provides an
empirical assessment of the effectiveness of the BKBM course. The new
BKBM course follows the structure of the Being Muslim Being British
course that exposes participants to the multiplicity of value priorities
that influential Muslims embody, and structures group activities that
allow participants to explore all value positions on issues central to
extremist discourse and relevant to events in Kenya, free from criticism
or social pressure. The intervention, a sixteen-contact-hour course using
films and group activities that enable participants to problem solve on
extremism-related topics according to a broad array of their own values,
was pre and post tested with twenty-four participants (twenty-two of
whom completed the full assessments), (mean age 29.6, SD = 6.27). As
hypothesized, Integrative Complexity (IC) increased significantly by the
end of the course in written verbal data, and there was clear evidence of
ability to perceive some validity in different viewpoints (achieving
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differentiation) in all oral participant presentations at the end of the
course.
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Introduction 
Our theoretic starting point is that the wider context for radicalisation and 
involvement in violent extremism (RIVE) is the interpenetration of cultures 
arising from globalization, which can increase a sense of threat to different 
cultural groups’ value priorities.  When groups feel that their values or 
worldview are threatened by the presence of other cultural worldviews, this 
can lead to a defensive retrenchment to a value monist position that conserves 
cultural or religious traditions.1  This maintains markers of social identity 
with the effect of highlighting differences between social groups, in 
accordance with social identity theory and social identity complexity theory.2  
While this protects people from uncertainty about identity and behavioural 
norms in the face of the competing value priorities of different cultures, it also 
reduces their complexity of thinking concerning intergroup relations.3  
Groups that are already primed to see their social world with low complexity 
are more easily attracted to the very low complexity, black and white, us 
versus them, extremist ideologies that are undergirded by value monism: one 
value must be realized above all others (the value the radicalizers themselves 
define per issue).4   
 
Radical groups ride on the normal defensive retrenchment to value monism 
and lowered complexity of thinking in the face of globalization threats, and 
work to intensify it through their ideology.  The low complexity of extremist 
ideology has been substantiated by linguistic analysis (including integrative 
complexity analyses), with al-Qaida-related extremism showing the lowest 
complexity.5  The normal tendency to prefer one’s own ingroup, seen in social 
identity studies using the Minimal Group paradigm are further intensified 
through extremists’ ‘us versus them’ binary constructions.6  Extremist groups 
that employ a narrative explaining the social world as powerfully arrayed 
against the ingroup’s interests can offer, for some, a pathway to belonging, 
significance and a purported means to address grievances.  A period of 
sequestration from family and friends and total commitment to the extremist 
group is the usual further step that precedes involvement in violent strikes.7 
 
Our recent assessment of the Being Muslim Being British intervention 
supports the idea that increasing the complexity with which people think 
about the issues that radicalizers exploit reduces vulnerability to extremist 
                                                        
1 Inglehart, R. and C. Wezel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human 
Development Sequence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
2 S. Roccas and M.B. Breir, “Social Identity Complexity”, Personality and Social Psychology 
Review 6:2 (2002): 88-106. 
3 Michael A. Hogg, "Uncertainty and extremism: Identification with high entitativity groups 
under conditions of uncertainty," in Vincent Yzerbyt, Charles M. Judd, and Olivier Corneille 
(eds.), The psychology of group perception: Perceived variability, entitativity, and 
essentialism (New York: Psychology Press, 2004). 
4 Ibid. 
5 Peter Suedfeld, Peter, Ryan Cross, Ryan and Caron Logan. “Can Thematic Analysis Separate 
the Pyramid of Ideas from the Pyramid of Actions? A Comparison Among Different Degrees of 
Commitment to Violence,” in Dr. Hriar Cabayan (JS/J-39), Dr. Valerie Sitterle (GTRI), and 
LTC Matt Yandura (JS/J-39) (eds.) Looking Back, Looking Forward: Perspectives on 
Terrorism and Responses to It, Strategic Multi-layer Assessment White Paper (Pentagon, 
September 2013), 61-68.  
6 Tajfel, Henri, Human Groups and Social Categories (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981).  
7 J. Ginges, S. Atran, S. Sachdeva and D. Medin, “Psychology out of the Laboratory: The 
Challenge of Violent Extremism” American Psychologist 66 (2011): 507–519. 
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messages, as a broad-based form of primary prevention.8  That method, which 
we have applied here to the Being Kenyan Being Muslim intervention 
operationalizes relevant value conflicts while providing the resources for 
people to apply a wider spread of their own values, which in turn promotes 
thinking complexity.9  Our approach is inspired by Isaiah Berlin who posits 
that human values (e.g. freedom, equality, security, achievement, tradition, 
etc.) are all equally important and desirable.  Values motivate behaviour and 
decisions; they organize cultural identity and bring significance to human 
life.10  Yet, due to limited resources or cultural constraints, individuals have 
to make choices: they often have to prioritise one value over the other, as any 
life context makes it extremely difficult to maximize all human values equally.  
Differences in value hierarchies between individuals and groups can be a 
source of conflict unless people are able to perceive some validity in the 
different value priorities of others, even if those don’t agree with their own 
value hierarchies.11 
 
The role that complexity in thinking plays in prevention of RIVE is supported 
by the finding that engineers, graduates of a field centered on problems that 
have a single, clear-cut, black and white answer, are significantly over-
represented among violent extremists.12 Further, research based on extensive 
fieldwork with violent extremists shows that sacred values, defined 
structurally by the impossibility for any co-mingling with other values, play a 
key role in motivating the actions of extremists.13 Our approach to primary 
prevention draws upon these lines of research and considers that, whatever 
pathway towards RIVE has been taken, what extremist ideologies have in 
common is a simple binary structure (‘us versus them’, ‘right versus wrong’) 
underpinned by value monism. This precise point of value monism is what we 
have targeted through our method of operationalizing value complexity in 
order to raise integrative complexity as a form of prevention in Kenya. 
 
The above argument is in line with a comprehensive review commissioned by 
the United Kingdom (UK) government into prevention initiatives.14 The 
report asserts that initiatives work best when they support open questioning 
in a peer group context and are focused on the harder skills such as critical 
thinking, appreciating different perspectives, developing a person’s own 
worldview, learning to work well with others and appreciating tensions 
between different viewpoints. These enable people to critically examine 
extremist discourse. Long lasting benefits come through building resilience 
through affirming complex social identities and developing conflict 
management skills. These goals cohere with the value complexity approach to 
prevention discussed here.  
                                                        
8 Jose Liht and Sara Savage. “Preventing Violent Extremism through Value Complexity: Being 
Muslim Being British,” Journal of Strategic Security 6:4 (2013): 44-66. 
9 Funded by USAID, organized by the Kenya Transition Initiative.  
10 Berlin, Isaiah, The Crooked Timber of Humanity (London: John Murray, 1990). 
11 Conway, Luke and K.R. Conway, The terrorist rhetorical style and its consequences for 
understanding terrorist violence: Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict (London: Routledge, 
2011); Suedfeld, Peter, Legkaia, K. and Brcic, J. "Changes in the hierarchy of value references 
associated with flying in space," Journal of Personality 78:5 (2010). 
12 Gambetta, Diego and Steffan Hertog, Engineers of Jihad (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2007).  
13 J. Ginges et al., "Psychology out of the Laboratory: The Challenge of Violent Extremism," 
American Psychologist 66 (2011). 
14 Department of Education, UK, “Teaching Approaches that Help Build Resilience Among 
Young People”, OPM and National Research Foundation, 2010. available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/182675/D
FE-RR119.pdf 
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Developing the Being Kenyan Being Muslim (BKBM) Intervention 
BKBM aims to remove the obstacles to participants’ normal cognitive 
development as it progresses from simplicity to complexity.  A vast literature 
supports that complex information processing, undergirded by the attempt to 
maximize multiple competing values, is associated with non-violent strategies 
for conflict resolution.15  A large body of cross-cultural research by Peter 
Suedfeld and colleagues shows that conflict is predicted when integrative 
complexity (IC, from henceforth) drops from its recent baseline (measured in 
the communication of political decision-makers); conversely when IC rises, 
peaceful solutions to conflict ensue.16  Because individuals are more receptive 
to messages with a complexity level similar to their own when thinking about 
conflicted social issues, increasing complexity builds resilience to the low 
complexity communications and recruitment efforts of extremists.17  
 
The pilot BKBM version (based on the structure of Being Muslim Being 
British) is a sixteen-contact-hour, multi-media course for people ages 16+ 
who are exposed to extremist discourse, as well as to train professionals who 
are seeking to counter extremism.  BKBM was adapted to include relevant 
aspects of Kenyan culture, the impact of global terrorism on Kenyan society, 
and the consequences of the events of the Westgate terrorist attacks in 
Nairobi in 2013, followed by reprisals on the Somali community in Eastleigh, 
Nairobi, Mombasa and other areas of Kenya where there is a high Somali 
population.  The intervention uses DVD films to represent an array of Muslim 
viewpoints from the extreme right to the extreme left including middle 
positions followed by group activities inspired by Theatre of the Oppressed 
pedagogy that help participants become aware of the value trade-offs in each 
position.18  The original BMBB course materials were augmented with images 
and music from Kenyan society and popular culture, making the effects of 
poverty, politics, corruption and the development of the middle class within 
Kenya society explicit in the activities, as efforts to re-create the cultural 
milieu in which the social nature of thinking proceeds.19  
 
We piloted BKBM in Eastleigh, Nairobi, Kenya in January 2014. Over four 
intense days, the schedule in Kenya comprised: 
 
Day 1. Pre-testing; Session (1) Life in Kenya; Session (2) Relationships 
and values. 
Day 2. Session (3) Equality; Session (4) Justice and money. 
Day 3. Session (5) Science and religion; Session (6) Peace or fitna. 
                                                        
15 P.E. Tetlock, Armor and Peterson, "The slavery debate in antebellum America: Cognitive 
style, value conflict, and the limits of compromise"; Carmit T. Tadmor, Philip E. Tetlock, and 
Kaiping Peng, "Biculturalism and integrative complexity: Testing the acculturation complexity 
model" (paper presented at the Academy of Management Proceedings, 2006/08). 
16 Peter Suedfeld, D.C. Leighton and Luke Conway, “Integrative Complexity and Cognitive 
Management in International Confrontations: Research and Potential Applications,” in M. 
Fitzduff & C.E. Stout, (eds.), The Psychology of War, Conflict Resolution, and Peace (New 
York: Praeger, 2005); Peter Suedfeld, K. Legkaia and J. Brcic, "Changes in the Hierarchy of 
Value References Associated with Flying in Space," Journal of Personality 78:5 (2010). 
17 Peter Suedfeld and Alistair B. Wallbaum, "Modifying Integrative Complexity in Political 
Thought: Value Conflict and Audience Disagreement," Revista Interamericana de Psicologia 
26:1 (1992). 
18 Boal, Augusto, Legislative Theatre: Using Performance to Make Politics (London: Routledge, 
1998). 
19 Vygostky, Luria S., Mind in Society: the Development of Higher Psychological Processes, 
Michael Cole, Vera John-Steiner, Sylvia Scribner, Ellen Souberman (eds.) (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press 1978). 
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Day 4. Session (7) Purity and Pleasure; Session (8) with participant 
presentations, and post-testing. 
 
BKBM’s three steps of transformation  
Transformation Step 1: Differentiation 
Like Being Muslim Being British, the explicit aim of BKBM is to increase 
thinking complexity promoted by value pluralism, measured by IC.20  The first 
aspect of IC is differentiation, the ability to perceive multiple viewpoints or 
dimensions on an issue.21  Eight topics used by radicalizers to increase 
cleavage between Muslim and Western-influenced worldviews and identities 
were selected, and each topic was presented from the differing perspectives of 
three to four well-known Muslim speakers via filmed interviews (on DVD) to 
promote differentiation.  For example, in session 1, to address the topic “How 
should young Muslims should live in Kenya?” four influential speakers 
present their different viewpoints arguing for 1) an international Caliphate, 2) 
separatist (Salafist) personal piety, 3) integrating into society while 
maintaining Muslim identity and faith, and 4) support for jihadism.  Through 
this, participants are motivated to make some sense of the variety of Muslim 
viewpoints, with group discussions relevant to tensions between Kenyans and 
ethnic Somalians, and are spurred to think afresh about the topic.  
 
Transformation Step 2: Value Pluralism 
Step 2 involves enabling participants to discover some validity in the values 
that undergird each of the four viewpoints, even the extreme ones, but 
without having to sacrifice other competing values—which is implicit in 
adopting every aspect of extreme viewpoints.  This second step of enabling 
value pluralism is operationalized through a dilemma structure for the 
session, and in which participants can find reasons to maximise a wider array 
of their own values in their moral reasoning.  We draw on Philip Tetlock’s 
Value Pluralism model22 that argues that a motivating force for doing the 
extra cognitive work of integratively complex thinking comes from the desire 
to maximise more than one value when those values are in tension with each 
other and each has high importance in participants’ personal hierarchies.  
While extremist ideologies concentrate, for example, on the magnetic pull of 
one value, such as ‘justice for the community’, to the exclusion of ‘individual 
liberty’, BKBM enables people to explore the importance of both ends of 
various value spectrums.  
 
After positioning the four film speakers along the value spectrums, 
participants are next invited to ‘vote with their feet’ to show where they 
personally position themselves on that value spectrum, and to explore the 
pushes and pulls they experience in their lives in Kenya.  Participants are 
encouraged to think about both value poles in a way consonant with their own 
value priorities and real life constraints, rather than remaining ‘stuck’ in the 
value monism of radical discourse.  In this way, cultural differences, for 
example, between Kenyan and Somali cultures, between aspirations for 
                                                        
20 Peter Suedfeld, K. Legkaia and J. Brcic, "Changes in the hierarchy of value references 
associated with flying in space."  
21 Suedfeld, Peter, Philip E. Tetlock and Siegfried Streufert, "Conceptual/Integrative 
Complexity" in Motivation and Personality: Handbook of Thematic Content Analysis, editors 
C.P. Smith, et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
22 Philip E. Tetlock, "A Value Pluralism Model of Ideological Reasoning," Journal of 
Personality & Social Psychology 50:4 (1986); Tetlock, Armor and Peterson, "The slavery 
debate in antebellum America: Cognitive style, value conflict, and the limits of compromise." 
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individual achievement versus loyalty to communitarian, traditional values, 
become easier to understand, and thus bridge, from a vantage point of value 
pluralism.  This is done in the context of non-judgemental discussion of all 
the possible positions on the values continuum and the tensions between 
them.23  Through these group-learning activities, the black and white 
categorizations resulting from increased cleavage between social groups begin 
to dissolve. 
 
Transformation Step 3: Integration 
Integratively complex thinking requires the ability to find some linkages 
between the different viewpoints, or to perceive an overarching framework 
that makes sense of why reasonable people can maintain differing views.24  
Value-complex solutions protect both sacred and secular values of different 
groups, and this in turn enables peaceful and stable resolutions for inter-
group conflict (of which violent extremisms are a particular type) in the 
context of globalization.  
 
For example, a group activity to foster integration (the discovery of linkages 
or frameworks to make sense of different viewpoints) centers around a 
conflict of interests between two polarized ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ groups, role-played 
by participants taking either the role of wealthy suburban home owners living 
in Nairobi suburb, or the role of refugee dwellers in a shanty town close to the 
town’s borders.  Participants experience how the conflict (physically, 
emotionally and cognitively) intensifies and polarizes perceptions of the 
ingroup and outgroup in the role play.  As both groups’ demands calcify, they 
slide into creating an over-simplified ideology, which intensifies the inter-
group conflict as people rally to their group’s slogans and group leader.  Role 
playing enables participants to ‘see’ the polarization between groups 
intensifying in the room.  ‘Mediators’ (role played by participants) are brought 
into the scene, and by focussing on the underlying human values of both 
groups’ demands, some value commonalities are discovered, as well as 
recognizing that some differences will continue to remain. Negotiation 
becomes possible, though not easy, once some common values are recognized 
in both groups.  Thus, the practical side of problem solving can begin. 
 
Building on experiential, embodied group learning such as this, participants 
reflect upon the various tensions, for example, between economic and 
political principles that promote the interests of the rich, in comparison with 
those that promote the interests of the poor, freed from value monism and the 
social pressure arising from extremist discourse that presents any Western 
economic principles and Islamic finance as completely alien to each other. 
The black and white communications of radicalizers come to appear less 
convincing, as trade-offs that respect participants’ own values are deemed 
possible, and are affirmed in a relevant peer group context. 
 
These activities enable a further set of IC-related skills: meta-cognition, social 
intelligence and embodied cognition.  Meta-cognition is supported by Theatre 
of the Oppressed pedagogy as physically enacted role-play enables 
participants to ‘see’ themselves, their reactions and perceptions of others, and 
to reflect on that through group discussion.  For example, a role-play where a 
‘stranger’ walks into the zone of an already established social group enabled 
participants to perceive the pervasive ingroup/outgroup dynamics between 
                                                        
23Tetlock, Armor Peterson, “The slavery debate…” 
24 Suedfeld, Tetlock and Streufert, "Conceptual/Integrative Complexity."  
Savage et al.: Preventing Violent Extremism in Kenya through Value Complexity
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2014
6 
 
Kenyans and Somalis.  Social intelligence skills are supported through 
empathy-fostering activities such as ‘active listening’ practiced through role 
play in trios of participants trying to reconcile a conflict that was once 
experienced by one of the trio members.  Mixed groups of participants, as in 
this sample, where both sides of the countering violent extremism (CVE) 
divide are involved in the role plays promotes the capacity to perceive 
differing perspectives.  Experiencing cognition as embodied and multi-
sensory is encouraged through group activities involving movement and 
mime, and through the multi-sensory DVD input (music, symbols, images, 
and film clips) resourcing a broader focus of attention, assuaging the 
defensive ‘tunnel vision’ of rigid thinking that can arise from concentrating on 
words and conceptual systems only.25  The educational process works with the 
dilemma structure in each session, using physical and interpersonal 
enactment through role plays, leading to a more complex narrative 
understanding of CVE related issues, with participants reflecting analytically 
upon their experiences through discussion.  Together these comprise the steps 
to complex critical thinking which in turn enables people to ‘see through’ the 
strategies of radicalizers.  
 
Effectiveness Evaluation 
We assessed the effectiveness of the eight session course through testing one 
main hypothesis and one exploratory hypothesis:  
 
As a result of the intervention, participants will think in more 
complex ways about social issues underpinned by conflicting values 
by showing an increase in the levels if IC (IC) when comparing verbal 
data gathered just before and after the course. 
 
The hypothesis was tested on two sets of verbal data: (Comparison 1) through 
the IC coding of written responses to Paragraph Completion Tests before and 
after the course, and (Comparison 2) through the qualitative analysis 
examining the presence of the two steps of IC (differentiation and integration) 
as applied by participants in the transcribed presentations each participant 
gave at the end of the course. 
 
1. An exploratory hypothesis to examine whether participants’ conflict 
styles change in the Post test (according to a Conflict Styles 
Questionnaire).26  
 
Figure 1: Pre and post-test comparisons 
 Pre test Post test Participant Presentations  
H1: Increase in IC  Comparison 1 Comparison 2 
H2: Change in conflict styles Comparison 3  
 
 
Method 
Sample and Recruitment 
                                                        
25 Sara Savage, “Head and Heart in Preventing Religious Radicalization,” in F. Watts and G. 
Dumbreck (eds.), Head and Heart: Perspectives from Religion and Psychology (West 
Conshohoken, PA: Templeton Press, 2013). 
26 Eolene Boyd-MacMillan, “Conflict Scenarios Questionnaire,” in Eolene Boyd-MacMillan and 
Sara Savage, Report on I SEE! Life Skills for a Changing Scotland, Empirical Effectiveness 
Report for the Scottish Government (2013). 
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Twenty-four participants participated, with twenty-two completing all aspects 
of the Pre and Post testing assessment.  Questionnaire data revealed a mean 
age of 29.6 (SD=6.27) years. Sex of participants was 12 (52 percent) males and 
11 (48 percent) females (one missing).  Of 24 participants, 23 (96 percent) 
were born in Kenya; one (4 percent) was born in Somalia, 18 (92 percent) had 
secondary education, 12 (50 percent) had technical college education (mean 
1.7 years), 9 (37 percent) had university education (mean 3.6 years), and 12 
(50 percent) had Islamic religious education (mean 6.5 years).  Eighteen (75 
percent) participants reported being in work; 7 (29 percent) reported being 
unemployed/looking for new work. 
 
Participants’ group/community of identification, or ingroup (the term used 
henceforth to indicate participants’ group/community with which they 
reported they strongly identified) were:  
 
• ‘Muslim’ (5 participants), ‘Kenyan Muslim’ (4),‘Sunni Muslim’ 
(1)‘Muslim Sunni in Africa’(1),‘Muslim/Christian’ (1), ‘Muslim 1st & 
my neighbour’ (1) 
• ‘Christian’ (3),‘Christian/Muslim’ (1) 
• ‘Kenyan’ (3) 
• ‘Somali’ (2) 
• ‘Kamba’ (1)  
• ‘People I live with in peace’(1). 
 
Of the twenty-three participants, 14 (61 percent) report firstly a Muslim 
identity.  
 
Participants’ self-designated outgroup (‘the group/community most 
different/opposed to my group’) are listed below: 
 
• Somalis (4), Somali & my own tribe (1) 
• Islam (1), Shias (2), Muslim/Christian/Islam (1),  
• Non-Somalis (1)  
• Christians (2), White Christians (1),  
• Western influenced (1), Secular (1), Secular & tribal (1) 
• My tribe (2), Kikuyu (1), Luo tribe (1),  
• Infidels & gangs (1), Terrorists (1), Al Shabaab (1), Radical Muslim 
youth (1), the inhumane (1) 
• Arab (1), Arabs & rich people (1), Hindu & rich people (1), 
Dishonest/fake (1), Non-coastal (1), African Rastafarians (1) 
• None/ I like everyone (2) 
 
Based on information from Kenya Transition Initiative staff, the participants 
are assigned to subgroups for statistical analysis: 
 
Subgroup 1 = Recent members of al Shabaab (n = 6) 
Subgroup 2 = KTI staff (n = 4) 
Subgroup 3 = Beneficiaries and grantees of KTI work (agencies and 
co-workers) (n = 10) 
Subgroup 4 = Moderately vulnerable individuals but not linked with al 
Shabaab (n = 2) .  
 
Of particular interest are the demographic characteristics of Subgroup 1 
comprising recent al Shabaab members.  Their profile is similar to the other 
Savage et al.: Preventing Violent Extremism in Kenya through Value Complexity
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groups in terms of higher education (out of six, two attended technical college, 
one attended university) and regarding employment (four are in work 
involving sign writing, ‘mobilizer’, business and community work), with two 
participants unemployed/looking for work.  Demographics that are distinctive 
for Subgroup 1 in comparison to the overall sample group concern gender 
balance (four males, two females), age (a higher mean age of 32), lower 
secondary education (four out of the six report having no secondary education 
(high school) whereas the rest of the sample have four years secondary and 
beyond), as well as fewer years in Islamic religious education (mean 4.8 years 
compared to 6.5 years).  Subgroup 1 also showed slightly higher scores on the 
Social Identity & Power (SIP) Scale (mean = 20.3) compared to Subgroups 2 
and 3 (mean = 17.15).  The SIP Scale consists of five items concerning 
perceived power relations between participant’s designated ingroup and 
outgroup.27  Higher mean scores indicate that the participant agrees or 
strongly agrees with statements that their ingroup is treated unfairly by a 
more powerful outgroup that does not allow ingroup upward mobility, and 
whose position of power is now possible to overturn—a set of social 
perceptions that maps onto the structure of radical narratives.28  Subgroup 4 
(moderately vulnerable participants, n =2) shows a similar pattern to 
Subgroup 1 with relatively higher SIP scores (mean = 20.0) and fewer years in 
Islamic education (mean = 1 year) in comparison to the wider sample. 
 
Sampling procedure 
We were invited by the Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI), funded by United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), to trial BKBM in 
Kenya.  Participants known through KTI’s intensive fieldwork in the 
Eastleigh, Nairobi area were selected based upon recent activity or alignment 
with extremist groups or ideology, and were invited by KTI to participate in 
the pilot BKBM course.  Subgroups 1 and 4 comprise the vulnerable-to-
extremism participants with whom KTI has been working, and Subgroup 3 
comprise co-workers in the field, organizations and individuals to whom KTI 
subcontract.  Subgroup 2 comprise KTI staff.  A balanced spread such as this, 
comprising targeted individuals and intervention providers in a single IC 
course, helps to engender perspective taking on both sides of the extremism 
divide, and brings alive the tensions relating to extremism, contributing to 
learning outcomes.  The BKBM course was facilitated by an experienced 
Being Muslim Being British facilitator who was born and raised in Kenya.  
 
Instruments/measures 
Paragraph Completion Tests. Two open ended paragraphs were presented 
during the Pre test and the Post test to elicit verbal data for IC coding.  To 
elicit this data, participants were first asked to write down answers to items A 
and B: 
 
                                                        
31 Jose Liht and Sara Savage, “Being Muslim Being 
British: A Multi-media Educational Resource for 
Young Muslims” in G. Joffe (ed) Radicalisation (IB 
Tauris, 2011). 
28 Sara Savage and Jose Liht, “Radical Religious Speech: How to Assemble the Ingredients of a 
Binary world view.” in J. Weinstein (ed), Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008).  
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(A) The community (group) that I indentify strongly with 
is_______________ 
 
(Examples: Kenyan... Muslim… Somali… Sufi… Islamic… African… my 
tribe … African Muslim… Secular… Salafi…Arab… Western influenced 
…White… Christian… Other… Use any combination) 
 
(B) The community (group) that is most unlike/ opposed to my group 
is_________________ 
 
Next, the facilitator led the participants in a ‘Think Aloud’ group warm-up 
exercise using two topics unrelated to extremism (preferred colours and 
foods) to encourage people to express their thinking freely and fully when 
writing out their responses.  ‘Think Aloud’ technique is standard practice 
when researchers are more interested in process of thinking, the ‘how’ of 
thinking, rather than in the content of thinking.29  
 
Next, participants were asked to write as much as they can in the blank space 
provided to answer two open-ended questions: 
 
1. When I think about MY community (group) … 
2. When I think about the OTHER group …  
 
Paragraph Completion Tests (PCTs) have established validity in eliciting 
responses that have an argument or evaluation structure and that can be 
coded for IC.30 
 
Participant presentations. Recordings (video and audio, with participant 
permission) were taken throughout, including all participant presentations 
given at the end of the last session.  Recordings were transcribed verbatim 
and labelled with the participant’s code.  
 
Transcripts of participant presentations were coded qualitatively for evidence 
of learning concerning the two steps of IC (differentiation and integration), 
and for evidence of confidence to address extremist issues with IC skills, and 
for increases in social intelligence (such as empathy for the ‘other’). 
 
Integrative complexity (IC). All IC coding for the Paragraph Completion Tests 
followed the standardized IC coding frame and protocol.31 Inter-coder 
reliability criteria was assessed by calculating Kappa levels between two 
trained coders blind to the pre-intervention post-intervention conditions. 
 
Demographics and Social Identity & Power measures. A short five-item 
demographics questionnaire was given at the end of the course, and the five-
item Social Identity & Power (SIP) Scale (concerning perceived power 
relations relative to the participant’s ingroup and outgroup), was given during 
both Pre and Post testing. (See Appendix.)  
 
                                                        
29 Erickson, K. A. and H.A. Simon, Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1984).  
30 E. H. Bottenberg, “Instrumental Characteristics and Validity of the Paragraph Completion 
Test (PCT) as a Measure of Integrative Complexity,” Psychological Reports 24 (1969): 437-38. 
31 Gloria Baker-Brown, E.J. Ballard, S. Bluck, B. Vries de, P. Suedfeld and P.E. Tetlock, “The 
Conceptual/Integrative Complexity Scoring Manual,” in C.P. Smith (ed.), Motivation and 
Personality: Handbook of Thematic Content Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992). 
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Conflict styles questionnaire. A conflict styles questionnaire with two 
scenarios for the Pre test, and two different scenarios for the Post test (see 
Appendix) was adapted to create Kenyan scenarios, and was used to assess 
pre-post changes in conflict style.  Each scenario was followed by five 
response options that captured Kraybill’s five empirically derived conflict 
style constructs.32  Kraybill’s five conflict style constructs differ on how much 
the issue in comparison to the persons/ relationships involved in the conflict 
are deemed important: 
 
1. Direct. The issue is deemed so important that a direct style of 
communication is used to address the conflict, if needed, at the 
expense of the relationship.  
2. Avoid. Neither the issue nor the relationships are deemed 
important, so avoiding the conflict is chosen.  
3. Accommodate. Preserving the relationship is deemed more 
important than the issue, so giving in to the other party is chosen in 
order to resolve the conflict. 
4. Compromise. Both the issue and relationships are deemed 
somewhat important.  Giving away something in order to gain 
something is deemed the best way to resolve the conflict.  
5. Collaborate. Creative ways to maximise both the high importance 
of values and the high importance of relationships are found to resolve 
the conflict.  
 
Procedure 
Eight two-hour BKBM sessions were completed over a period of four days, led 
by a trained course facilitator with the aid of a BKBM facilitator’s manual. The 
venue for the course was a hotel conference suite in Nairobi, with breaks 
allocated for lunch, tea and prayers. Attendance records show full attendance 
across the four days for the twenty-two participants who completed the Pre 
and Post testing. 
 
Results 
Intercoder Reliability 
In order to verify the reliability of IC scores across pre and post conditions, 
one researcher coded all the paragraphs from the Paragraph Completion Tests 
(4 x 22 = 88), blind to pre-post conditions.  In accordance with accepted 
practice, a secondary scorer blind to the pre-post conditions, coded eight 
paragraphs (around 10 percent of a stratified random subsample, 
representing relevant subgroups and spread of IC).33  
 
Cohen’s Kappa index of reliability (which measures for exact correspondence, 
not just correlation) was calculated for the IC scores of the Paragraph 
Completion Tests.  The result, Kappa = 0.89, indicated a very good intercoder 
reliability levels (93.3 percent agreement, SD= 0.20, Z = 4.43, p > 0.00001). 
 
                                                        
32 Eolene Boyd-MacMillan, “Conflict Scenarios Questionnaire,” in Eolene Boyd-MacMillan and 
Sara Savage, Report on I SEE! Life Skills for a Changing Scotland, Empirical Effectiveness 
Report for the Scottish Government; Ronald S. Kraybill and Evelyn Wright, The Little Book of 
Cool Tools for Hot Topics: Group Tools to Facilitate Meetings When Things Are Hot 
(Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 2006). 
33 Baker-Brown, Ballard, Bluck, de Vries, Suedfeld, Tetlock, “The Conceptual/Integrative 
Complexity Scoring Manual.”  
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Comparison 1. Hypothesis 1: IC in Written Responses to Paragraph 
Completion Tests 
 
In order to test whether BKBM was effective in increasing the complexity with 
which participants think about conflicted social issues relevant to extremism, 
we coded the Paragraph Completion Tests (PCTs) for all twenty-two 
participants according to IC coding practice (measuring the underlying 
structure of thinking) and compared scores for participants’ paragraphs at the 
beginning of Session 1 (Pre test) and at the end of Session 8 (Post test). All 
coding was performed under blind-to-group and condition, by two trained IC 
coders. 
 
A paired samples t-test was carried out. Mean IC level for the pre-test was 
1.32 (SD=0.29), the post-test was 1.95 (SD=0.53) and the mean gain in IC was 
0.63 (SD=0.45). See Chart 1. 
 
The statistical t-test of difference between pre-test and post-test (related 
samples) for IC (M=-0.625, SD=0.45, n = 22, t (19) = -6.140, p >0.0001) 
provided evidence for an increase in IC levels.  
 
Chart 1: Comparisons of Mean IC Scores in Pre and Post Test  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IC Comparisons for Ingroup and Outgroup 
Mean IC level for the Pre-test participants’ designated ingroup (the 
‘group/community with which I strongly identify’) was 1.43 (SD=0.57), the 
post-test was 2.29 (SD=0.72) and the mean gain in IC was 0.86 (SD=0.45).  
The statistical t-test of difference between pre-test and post-test (paired 
samples) for IC was t (20) = -5.403, p <0.0001) provided evidence for an 
increase in IC levels in regard to participants’ ingroup. 
 
Mean IC level for the post-test outgroup (the ‘group/community 
different/opposed to my group’) was 1.19 (SD=0.41), the post-test was 1.57 
(SD=0.81) and the mean gain in IC was 0.38 (SD=0.45).  The statistical t-test 
of difference between pre-test and post-test (paired samples) for IC was t (20) 
= -2.169, p <0.042) provided evidence for an increase in IC levels in regards 
to participants’ outgroup. 
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Post test, with the smallest magnitude of change. 
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Chart 2: IC Pre and 
Hypothesis 1 was supported overall.
had an effect of increasing the complexity with which participants think about 
social issues and social groups relevant to extremism as indicated by levels of 
IC.  
 
Comparison 2. Hypothesis 2
Participants’ Presentations 
At the end of the final session, participant
The facilitator had instructed
to give a presentation at the end of Session 8
through the course, and how they
specific situations relevant to
presentation.  These were tape recorded (yiel
transcribed verbatim. 
presence of learning about and applying 
ability to perceive the validity of two or more dimensions, viewpoints or
outcomes to temporal se
perceive underlying common values, linkages between, or overarching 
frameworks, that make sense of the differentiated array
verbal data that fulfilled 
these were summed for a final cumulative 
This is a qualitative measure 
constructs; it is not a coding of the structure of argumentation.
 
 participants’ self-designated 
utgroup IC gains are significant. 
 trend of higher IC gains for the ingroup
ed differences in overall IC gains. Subgroup 2 (KTI 
 and Post tests.  Subgroup 1 
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See Chart 2.  However, all 
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 analysis of variance, F (22)=1.086, p=0.167.
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Participant Presentation Scores were correlated with the participants’ Post 
test mean IC scores (paired samples).  The Presentation Scores correlated 
significantly with participants’ Post test mean IC scores (Spearman’s rho (21) 
= 0.81, p <0.01, two tailed). 
 
Qualitative analysis revealed evidences of understanding and applying 
differentiation in 100 percent (22 of 22) participant presentations.  Evidence 
of understanding and applying integration were present in 50 percent (11 of 
22) of participant presentations.  Qualitative analysis showed that 
participants experienced an increase in social intelligence as a result of the 
course (for example, gaining insight into own and other people’s views and 
experiences, particularly for those who are different, empathy for others, and 
new emotional control) were evident in 77 percent (17 of 22) of participant 
presentations.  Evidence of confidence gained from applying the skills and 
principles of IC to conflicts relevant to extremism and in everyday life were 
evident in 100 percent of the presentations.  
 
Comparison 3. Conflict Styles Questionnaire 
As increased value complexity and thinking complexity (IC) promotes 
resolution of conflict34, we explored whether conflict styles changed as a result 
of the course.  Five conflict styles are empirically discriminated by Kraybill: 
Direct, Accommodate, Avoid, Compromise and Collaborate.35  Results show 
that the Direct conflict style significantly increases and that Avoid, 
Compromise and Collaborate significantly decreased in the Post test.  The 
Post test change in the Direct conflict style is of the greatest magnitude.  See 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Conflict Styles Pre and Post Test  
 Pre 
mean 
SD Post 
mean 
SD t 
statistic 
df p 
Avoid 6.29 1.51 4.33 2.01 4.254 23 .000 
Direct 4.32 2.15 8.81 1.81 -9.160 21 .000 
Accommodate 6.91 2.51 8.13 2.03 -1.719 22 Non sig 
Compromise 6.09 1.94 4.17 2.79 2.244 22 0.035 
Collaborate 7.52 1.38 4.86 1.63 6.388 22 0.000 
 
Correlations with SIP Scale and Demographics Questionnaire - Post Hoc 
Analysis  
We explored the relationship of demographic characteristics and SIP Scale 
factors with IC and conflict styles (there was no difference between SIP scores 
Pre test compared with Post test, and this holds across all four Subgroups). 
 
Years in Islamic religious education correlate negatively with IC regarding the 
ingroup, but positively (and significantly) for the outgroup in the Post 
condition (Pearsons r (20)=0.627, p=0.039. See Table 2, below. 
 
Of interest are two trends: years in Technical College correlates negatively 
with IC, but years in University correlates positively with IC, particularly 
towards the ingroup; these are moderate but non-significant correlations. See 
Table 2. 
 
                                                        
34 Suedfeld, Leighton and Conway, “Integrative Complexity and Cognitive Management…” 
35 Kraybill, Ronald S. and Wright, Evelyn, The little book of cool tools for hot topics : group 
tools to facilitate meetings when things are hot (Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 2006). 
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Table 2. Parametric Correlations Between Education and IC Scores  
 Pre test Post test 
 Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup 
Years in 
Islamic 
education 
-.125 .276 -.161 .627 
Significance  ns ns ns p=0.039 
Years in 
Technical 
College 
-.324 -.212 -.039 -.324 
Significance ns ns ns ns 
Years in 
University 
.429 .364 .424 .335 
Significance ns ns ns ns 
 
The five-item SIP Scale, as explained earlier, measures perceptions of power 
relations concerning participants’ self-identified ingroup and outgroup.  High 
scores on the SIP Scale indicate perceptions of one’s ingroup as unfairly 
treated by a more powerful outgroup that does not allow for ingroup upward 
mobility, and whose powerful position is likely to be overturned.  SIP scores 
were slightly higher for Subgroups 1 and 4 (ex-al Shabaab and moderately 
vulnerable participants, respectively) in comparison with the wider sample. 
The Post test SIP scale correlated negatively with IC scores for the outgroup in 
the Post test (Pearsons r (20)= -.506, p <0.027 two tailed). 
 
Age correlated negatively with IC scores in the Pre test concerning 
participants’ ingroup, (Pearsons r (20)= -0.477, p = 0.029, two tailed). 
 
Correlations with conflict styles 
 
Years in Islamic religious education correlated negatively with the Direct 
conflict style in the Pre test (Pearsons r (20)= -.665, p <0.025, two tailed). In 
the Post test, the negative correlation is lower, and not significant (-.117, ns). 
This pattern of negative correlation was evident across all four Subgroups. 
 
The Avoid conflict style Post test correlates negatively with mean IC in the 
Post test (Pearsons r (20) = -0.439, p = 0.041, two tailed).  There were no 
other significant correlations between conflict styles and IC. 
 
Discussion 
The BKBM course results shows overall significant gains in IC in written 
responses to Paragraph Completion tests, from a mean IC score of 1.3 in the 
Pre test to a score of 1.9 in the Post test.  An IC score of 1 (from a scale of 1 to 
7) indicates the lowest level of integrative: viewing, for example, social groups 
categorically (all good or all bad), dichotomising the social world into ‘us 
versus then’, judging the domain in question from a single evaluative 
viewpoint, rejecting other viewpoints or dimensions (‘only my viewpoint is 
correct’), reducing ambiguity (no shades of grey, no mixture), with causation 
simply conceived as, for example, ‘x causes y’.  
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As the complexity of extremist discourse decreases as commitment to violence 
increases, the very low IC level of AQ discourse inevitably precludes any other 
means to resolve conflict other than mobilisation to their cause.36  As this 
constructed moral obligation to engage in violent conflict comes to be seen as 
unecessary through the IC intervention, more productive means to resolve 
conflict become possible.  New ways of resolving conflict are experienced 
within the course and validated within a relevant peer group.  
 
An IC score of 2 (rounding up from 1.9) signifies emerging or conditional 
acceptance of other dimensions or viewpoints regarding the issue at hand, 
though this is not extensively developed.  At an IC score of 2, rather than 
seeing the social world categorically and dichotomously, now multiple 
dimensions to an issue and exceptions to the rule are being acknowledged.  
Shades of grey, rather than black or white choices, are conditionally accepted, 
there is an increased tolerance for ambiguity, and an acceptance that others 
may hold different viewpoints from one’s one.  However, this is a transitional 
stage given that argumentation is not extensively elaborated.  In this study, 
this significant increase to an IC score of 2, while not large numerically, is a 
meaningful change in regards to the diminishment of violent conflict: other 
ways of construing the social world are now made possible, the categorical, 
black and white structure of the extremist worldview is dissolving. 
 
It is acknowledged that there are floor effects to measuring IC.  It is quite hard 
to capture enough argumentation or evaluation in verbal data for IC to be 
scorable, and this is particularly hard under written ‘test conditions’ such as 
the written Pre and Post testing here.  The advantage of measuring IC is that, 
as well as being predictive of the outcomes of conflict, the structure of 
thinking is relatively unfakable.  When people think, their attention is focused 
on the content of their thinking, not its underlying structure.  Thus, to capture 
a significant change in the structure of thinking represents data that is 
virtually unfakable on the part of participants, especially under test conditions 
where pre-planning is not possible.  Whereas it is acknowledged that speakers 
can apply some ‘impression management’ in their verbalizations, for example, 
using lower IC when speaking to children, it would be very hard to fake a rise 
in IC concerning issues one feels strongly about.   
 
In line with theories of individual cognitive development, and that of and 
early humans, change in the structure of argument (measured by IC) 
leveraged in the BKBM intervention represents the last stage of a series of 
deeper changes that firstly involve embodied enactment, then interpersonal, 
episodic learning, thirdly linking those earlier stages into a narrative, and 
finally reflecting upon that conceptually.37  Thus, we argue that the changes 
that are visible through IC coding are in fact the tip of a deeper ‘iceberg’.  We 
are pleased that we were able to capture significant IC gain, given the known 
floor effects of IC and the challenge of eliciting verbal data showing argument 
or evaluation under test conditions.  We also think that the simple, open-
ended Paragraph Completion Test items were a better way to elicit IC codable 
data in comparison with the detailed moral dilemmas (with their greater 
                                                        
36 Suedfeld, Cross, and Logan, “Can Thematic Analysis Separate the Pyramid of Ideas from the 
Pyramid of Actions?”.  
37 Jerome Bruner, “The Narrative Construction of Reality,” Critical Inquiry 18:1(1991): 1-21; 
Vygostsky, Luria S., Mind in Society; Bellah, Robert, Religion in Human Evolution: From the 
Paleolithic to the Axial Age, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
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cognitive load) that we had used in the first assessment of Being Muslim 
Being British.38 
 
Gains in IC are significant for participants’ self-designated ingroup and 
outgroup, but are of greater magnitude for the ingroup.  This may reflect that 
fact that information about one’s own ingroup is more readily available to 
thinkers.39  It also mirrors the process of de-radicalization described in 
autobiographical accounts of those who have exited extremist groups.40  In 
these accounts, extremists de-covert from their former radical cause often 
through a growing awareness of the flaws and contradictions of the extremist 
ingroup, particularly the ingroup leaders.  The growing perception that the 
extremist ingroup comprises variously motivated individuals who are mixture 
of both good and bad is a crucial step towards being able to critically analyse 
the ingroup’s mission and methods.  BKBM helps to bring about this 
awareness indirectly, as a direct frontal attack against a participant’s ingroup 
and its ideology is likely to elicit defensiveness.  Instead, our approach is to 
leverage the skills of complex thinking across a range of issues (some directly 
concerning extremism, others concern underlying issues, such as family 
relationships, gender equality and sex) and through increasing participants’ 
recognition of their own spread of values. 
 
A low complexity paragraph about a participants’ ingroup is seen in this Pre-
test paragraph: 
 
“al Shabaab – the most important obligation for Muslims is to make 
kufirs suffer for what they have inflicted on Muslims living in that.” 
(IC score 1, former al Shabaab member, Pre test) 
 
A higher complexity paragraph about another participants’ ingroup is seen in 
this Post-test paragraph:  
 
“I feel my group [Christians] deliberately misleads its members about 
what Muslims believe in.  I feel there is a subtle hatred in a way.  There 
is a feeling that their belief is not grounded in history and that is not 
true.  There is a misunderstanding about what Muslims believe in 
simply because Christians do not know a lot about Muslims. I feel that 
some people (Christians) can not tell the difference between Somalis, 
Arabs and Muslims, and that makes it hard for them to differentiate 
between cultures and religion.  I also wish this community should 
learn to be more accomodating as they have more power and the more 
extreme they get in thought, the more it is bad for reconciliation and 
finding a true understanding between Muslims and Christians.” (IC 
score 4, showing multiple dimensions and causality understood as 
implicitly involving mutual influence, Subgroup 3 participant, Post 
test). 
 
We expected that the four Subgroups would show differences in IC gains, and 
this was the case.  Nevertheless, there were no significant between-groups 
differences.  The most professionally resourced group, Subgroup 2, (KTI 
                                                        
38 Jose Liht and Sara Savage, “Preventing Violent Extremism through Value Complexity.” 
39 Tajfel, H. and Turner, J.C., “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict,” The Social 
Psychology of Intergroup Relations (1979): 33-47. 
40 Husein, Ed, The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside and Why 
I Left (Penguin 2007); Nawaz, Maajid, Radical: My Journey from Extremist Islamism to a 
Democratic Awakening (London: WH Allen, 2013). 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 7, No. 3
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol7/iss3/2
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.7.3.1
17 
 
staff), showed the highest mean IC in the Pre test, and the highest mean in the 
Post test. Subgroup 1 (former al Shabaab members) showed the lowest IC in 
the Pre test and Post test.  Two factors seem relevant here: Subgroup 1 had 
four (of six) participants with no secondary (high school) education as well as 
less Islamic religious education, compared to the wider group.  They also 
showed higher SIP scores, indicative of the influence of extremist narrative.  
These factors make it likely that Subgroup 1 faced a longer and harder journey 
in emerging from very low IC, although progress was made.  
 
It is interesting that years in Islamic religious education correlates negatively 
with IC regarding the Pre test, but correlates positively (and significantly) for 
the outgroup in the Post test.  The correlation between Islamic education and 
IC is the only correlation that shows significant reversal, comparing Pre to 
Post conditions.  It seems that IC, as a result of the intervention, is acting as a 
moderator on the variable ‘years in Islamic religious education’, at least in 
regard to perceptions of the outgroup in the Post test.  If this interpretation is 
correct, IC seems to ‘turbo charge’ traditional Islamic teaching regarding 
mercy and benevolence to the ‘other’ in the Post test.  Years in university 
correlates moderately with IC gain (but not significantly so) towards the 
ingroup (only), whereas years in technical college correlates negatively with 
IC (also not significantly) in both Pre and Post tests, in line with research 
showing that those well trained to solve problems having a concrete ‘right 
answer’ (such as engineering problems) are over-represented among violent 
extremists.41  
 
The negative correlation between SIP scores and IC provides a snapshot of the 
essence of the problem that all counter-extremism efforts face: those more 
deeply committed to an extremist narrative have a longer journey to emerge 
from it, and this is particularly so if the nature and length of education fails to 
resource the normal developmental pathway from simplicity to complexity.  
The results of this BKBM course show encouraging but realistic results in this 
regard: the IC approach does work with individuals at the ‘sharp end’ of 
prevention who are more closely aligned to the structure of the extremist 
narrative (and, here, who are also under-resourced through a lack of 
secondary education).  However, the gains in IC for Subgroup 1 are more 
modest than with the other groups, and these participants would have 
benefitted from more time and personal mentoring, had the schedule allowed.  
 
We originally developed Being Muslim Being British for primary prevention, 
for anyone potentially vulnerable to radicalization in the early stages.  In this 
pilot of Being Kenyan Being Muslim, the stakes have been raised with the 
inclusion of participants who have been members of a terrorist group.  We 
have recently argued in a U.S. State Department White Paper, that secondary 
and tertiary prevention needs to take a multi-agency approach, to which the 
IC method can bring an important contribution.42  In a further roll-out of 
BKBM seeking to include violent extremists (as in this pilot), the IC 
intervention will need to be part of a joined-up strategy with other agencies 
for ongoing support.  Recruiting a mixed group of participants including 
target audience and prevention workers, as in this project, works to kickstart a 
multi-agency approach, as well as eliciting intense discussion and 
involvement. We also advise that one-to-one IC mentoring is provided for 
extremely vulnerable participants in addition to the BKBM course to help 
them consolidate the gains that the IC sessions produce.  Normal practice is to 
                                                        
41 Gambetta, Diego and Steffen Hertog, Engineers of Jihad. 
42 Jose Liht and Sara Savage, “Preventing Violent Extremism with Value Complexity.” 
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run an IC intervention over a four to eight week duration (not over days as in 
this pilot, necessitated by schedule and budget constraints), and to assign 
practical weekly homework tasks. Longer periods for processing the material 
helps participants to reflect upon and integrate the new ways of thinking.  It is 
also normal practice for group size to be capped at twelve to sixteen 
participants, rather than twenty-four as in this pilot.  Despire these 
challenges, including the need for ongoing translations between English, 
Swahili and Somali during each session, it is encouraging that the BKBM 
intervention did show significant IC gains.  
 
Participant Presentations 
Through empirical assessments of other IC courses (I SEE for Scotland, an 
anti-sectarian IC course, and Conflict Transformation, a course for various 
inter-group conflicts, and Being Muslim Being British), we have observed two 
kinds of effects: (1) changes to the less-than-conscious structure of thinking, 
measured by IC coding, and (2) learned cognitive, emotional and inter-
personal skills.43  To assess the latter effect, we analysed participant 
presentations for evidence of learning about and application of IC skills.  The 
participant presentations at the end of the course make it easier for 
participants to reveal the extent of their IC learning as they have time to 
prepare what they want to share (prepared verbal data is similar to the 
speeches, letters, parliamentary proceedings that are usually used for 
integrative complexity research).44  
 
We qualitatively analyzed the verbatim transcripts of twenty-two 
presentations for presence of understanding and application of (1) 
differentiation, (2) integration, (3) social intelligence (empathy for others, 
insight into self or others, greater emotional control) and (4) confidence in 
applying IC skills. 
 
Differentiation 
All participant presentations showed instances of participants applying the 
construct of differentiation: the ability to perceive multiple dimensions to an 
issue and that there is some validity in different views, exceptions to the rule, 
and changes over time. Examples include: 
 
 “IC is about how we perceive the world.  Seeing through our religious 
faith, not just blind faith, but using both head and heart.  IC allows you 
to see the shadows, to see both points of view.  Active listening helps 
you to interact well.” (Subgroup 3 participant) 
 
“Religion leads us to the right path. Religion makes you strong.  But 
there are situations where you should sidestep your religion.  It 
doesn’t mean … it doesn’t make you a real Muslim… its not just about 
wearing a hijab, covering yourself.  Yes, you should do that but there 
are places where you shouldn’t walk with your hijab.  You should 
balance your life and religion and other people’s culture.” (Subgroup 3 
participant) 
 
“I’ve learned to be an active listener, even with those whom I disagree. 
Understanding different community values and cultures.  It will help 
                                                        
43 For information about I SEE course, see: http://iseeinscotland.org.uk 
and www.ICTcambridge.org, Conflict Transformation page. 
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you avoid conflict.  Thinking for yourself.  I am the one who is doing 
the deciding.” (Subgroup 1 participant) 
 
“In Kenya we have different community of different origins, different 
religious leaders.  We need IC for Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Jews so 
that religious leaders can understand among themselves and have 
common ground.” (Subgroup 2 participant) 
 
“When we love Muslims we are not saying that what they are all doing 
is right.  It is a sin to kill.  It is a sin to do what they are doing, like 
Westgate.” (Subgroup 4 participant) 
 
“We have to be able to evaluate what section we are in. Are we in low 
IC? - which is very difficult and dangerous, like black and white, about 
us and them, and it is so easy to create conflict.  And that is where the 
world is at now.” (Subgroup 3 participant) 
 
“IC is about how we see. It will differentiate depending on whether you 
are male or female and where you come from.” (Subgroup 3 
participant) 
 
Integration 
Fifty percent of participant presentations showed application of the construct 
of integration, suggesting more participants understood the higher levels of IC 
than was evident in the test conditions of the Pre and Post testing: 
 
“How religion and science integrate.  Some people believe religious is 
the only source.  Some people say science is the source.  Each see from 
a different perspective, from different directions.” (Subgroup 2 
participant) 
 
“Like thinking outside the box.  Finding the deep values, principles, 
underlying each view. That is the time we can come to an integration. 
So that is the most time that came to me, like weaving [integrating] 
our thoughts together, weaving our thinking together, weaving our 
relationships and values together. It goes beyond our religion, goes 
beyond our relationships and our values and it thelps me in our day to 
day life.” (Subgroup 3 participant) 
 
“Science and the truth between the two.  Which one is the truth?  IC is 
about finding out how science and religion complement one another.  
The equal aspect betweeen religion and science.” (Subgroup 4 
participant) 
 
“This IC, thinking beyond, this thinking about my religion that I just 
took for granted, like halal.  You are just looking for the label halal on 
the packet of seed but you never know why, what is the criterion.  Are 
they qualified to judge this?  Then there is this thing about religion 
and the Western world – how do you view Islam from the Western 
world?” (Subgroup 3 participant) 
 
“I just learned that you can integrate and explain the two worlds and 
come up with a better world.” (Subgroup 3 participant) 
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“I have learned a lot - how to solve interconnected problems and 
complex ideas. Before you impose, you listen first.” (Subgroup 2 
participant) 
 
Based on the number of instances of differentiation and integration per 
presentation, Participant Presentation Scores correlated highly and 
significantly with IC Post test scores, strengthening our confidence in the 
effectiveness of the course. 
 
Social / Emotional Intelligence 
77 percent of participants evidenced felt they experienced increases in their 
social and emotional intelligence through the course: 
 
“The first day I was scared but I’ve interacted with colleagues and 
become motivated.  It taught me how to relate to society, how to relate 
to the rest of the public.” (Subgroup 1 participant, former al Shabaab 
member) 
 
“It’s about why is this person doing this?  Then you can try to calm the 
situation so that you can handle it bettter.” (Subgroup 4 participant) 
 
“It taught me I can manage my anger.” (Subgroup 1 participant, 
former al Shabaab member) 
 
“I learned about Fitna and Islam.  Fitna is bad – it leads to hatred and 
its can spread in the community and lead to the dissolution of the 
community.” (Subgroup 1, former Al Shabaab member) 
 
“IC gives me another eye opener, gives me more inspiration.  Gives me 
knowledge to live with other people as Muslim, to live with my 
brothers who are Christian.  How I can stay with them like 
brotherhood.” (Subgroup 3 participant) 
 
“It taught me how to share ideas with people, how to live with different 
faiths and to overcome hatred.” (Subgroup 3 participant) 
 
“We need to be together so that we love one another.” (Subgroup 1 
participant, former al Shabaab member) 
 
Confidence 
Confidence in addressing the conflicts and value tensions that underpin 
extremism through new skills and abilities was present in 100 percent of 
participant presentations, for example: 
 
“Now I can handle any situation, to accept other’s culture knowing we 
are all different.  We all have different perspectives.  We shouldn’t 
judge eachother but pick the good from each others’ perspective to 
make something good.” (Subgroup 2 participant) 
 
“I think this program will help.  It changed my life, Ahumdulillah.  I 
want to change others who are out there.  OK, they don’t know 
anything about Pleasure and Purity.” (Subgroup 3 participant) 
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“Listening to people who are fighting…Where I come from, we have 
these kinds of situations everyday.  People attacking you from all sides.  
Not giving black and white in return. [This] gives me a feeling of 
belonging.  Giving me more hope.” (Subgroup 3 participant) 
 
“Going through mirroring, validating, empathizing.  Where to use it?  
Where applicable?  With friends.  At work.  Or when you are not able 
to understand your friend.  At home, especially with siblings when 
they will not do as you say, voices are raised.  With couples, it can 
work.  Domination – men bossing women.  Use it.  This brings youth 
groups together, not polarizing.” (Subgroup 2 participant) 
 
“If you can change one youth, and he changes two youth, and then he 
changes two youth, then a lot will change…I want to have a job in this.” 
(Subgroup 3 participant) 
 
“…with this course I will use it in my community…I will give them the 
hope of that awareness to continue what IC teaches me and what I 
have learnt from that teaching…we are all human beings created 
together, this course has given me hope for life, I must listen when my 
temper is high…” (Subgroup 3) 
 
Conflict Styles 
The conflict style Avoid decreased, as did Compromise and Collaborate, 
whereas Direct significantly increased.  The previous conflict styles analysis 
for Being Muslim Being British45 employed a qualitative coding frame based 
on Kraybill’s five empirically derived constructs, and that research on young 
British Muslims showed a significant increase in the combined scores of 
Compromise and Collaboration conflict styles.46  The different patterns 
shown here with BKBM may be due to the different instruments used: a 
qualitative analysis of spontaneous group discussion data was employed for 
Being Muslim Being British; the Conflict Scenarios Questionnaire was used 
for BKBM.  However, it does seem that differences between the UK and 
Kenyan cultural contexts also play a role here, impacting how conflict is 
perceived and what is deemed appropriate in the Kenyan context.  
 
It may be that the Collaboration conflict style, which builds on the hope of 
win/win solutions achieved for both parties, seems unrealistic in the 
Eastleigh, Nairobi context given the widespread lack of trust between groups 
and potential danger in daily public life (all four conflict scenarios concerned 
events played out in public).  The Compromise conflict style, giving away 
something in order to get something, may seem akin to the practice of 
resolving disputes through giving baksheesh, a problem that was discussed by 
large majority of participants, speaking of endemic corruption and the 
ubiquitous nature of the giving and receiving of bribes.   
 
Another interpretation is suggested by the strong, negative correlation 
between years in Islamic religious education and the Direct conflict style in 
the Pre test.  This relationship noticeably lessens in the Post test (though 
remains non significant).  It may be that traditional Islamic teaching 
concerning submission to fate (Allah), conforming to duty and controlling 
self-expression, serves to ‘suppress’ the Direct pro-social conflict style in the 
                                                        
45 Ibid. 
46 Ronald S. Kraybill and Wright, Evelyn The Little Book of Cool Tools for Hot Topics.  
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Pre test.  It is arguable that values of traditional religious self-transcendence 
are in tension with the Direct conflict style in which the person clearly states 
their viewpoint regarding a conflict, and considers the issue important 
enough to stick their neck out, even if there is cost to the relationships 
involved.47  It may be that the ethic of self-transcendence taught in Islamic 
education is moderated by the IC intervention, which then allowed 
participants in the Post-test to choose the Direct conflict style, perhaps 
because it was deemed was more effective within the Kenyan context.  If this 
interpretation is correct, this accords with participants’ general sense of 
empowerment and confidence at the end of the course, as well as IC as a 
moderator of years in Islamic religious education.  
 
The developers of the conflict styles constructs originally viewed Collaborate 
as the best, most adaptive conflict style, as it seeks win /win solutions using 
creative thinking.48  (Compromise enables both parties to get some but not 
most of what they want.)  The preference for Collaboration as the ‘best’ 
conflict style was later amended, as it became evident that all five conflict 
styles can be used positively for resolving conflict.  What matters is the ability 
to choose the conflict style that best suits the situation (a form of meta-
cognition), and having pro-social motivations and social intelligence in using 
the conflict styles.  This parallels research that acknowledges that high levels 
of IC are not universal goods given the cognitive costs of highly complex 
thinking in certain situations.49  For both conflict styles and IC, it seems what 
is needed is meta-cognition to enable flexibility and awareness of context. 
Because the IC of extremist ideology is so low, the first step in countering 
extremism is to enable participants to raise their IC.  But thereafter, the more 
advanced skills of IC concern meta-cognition to assess the situation for the 
most appropriate level of IC. 
 
For a future roll-out of the course, BKBM course gains can be strengthened, as 
argued above, through using the standard course run over weeks (not days) 
along with one-to-one mentoring for highly vulnerable participants.  The final 
course version is planned to include tensions between Christians and 
Muslims, the gap between the (newly) rich and the poor, and lack of security, 
all of which are part of the context of radicalization.  Community settings will 
continue to provide good contexts for disseminating BKBM, but we think that 
in the future the widest dissemination of IC courses will be through schools 
(for ages 11 and upwards).  We are already working in schools in several 
countries, and early results show that the most disruptive students undergo 
significant behavioural changes (independently observed by teachers and 
head teachers).  Our next project is taking place in a large number of schools 
in south Asia, and this provides an opportunity for control groups and 
longitudinal research. 
 
Conclusion 
The positive participant response in conjunction with the empirical data 
indicates that BKBM was a success in Kenya. BKBM’s method of exposing 
participants to a multiplicity of value priorities through group activities 
structured to enable participants to explore the implications of the whole of 
the value spectrum was measured through pre and post testing.  The written 
                                                        
47 Shalom H. Schwartz and Klaus Boehnke, "Evaluating the structure of human values with 
confirmatory factor analysis," Journal of Research in Personality 38:3 (2004). 
48 Ibid. 
49 Suedfeld, Leighton and Conway, “Integrative Complexity and Cognitive Management…” 
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data showed, as hypothesized, significant gains in IC, the ability to think in 
more complex ways about the issues relevant to extremism, measured by IC, 
followed by even greater IC understanding and application evident in the 
participant presentations.  According to the integrative complexity literature, 
and in line with RIVE research and prevention initiatives, such changes 
predict pro-social rather than violent means to resolve conflict.  Participants’ 
significant shift towards Direct as a conflict style is in line with the new 
confidence and empowerment participants expressed.  The overall picture 
supports the efficacy of this IC and values complexity based intervention, 
designed originally for broad-based primary prevention, but here also shown 
to be an effective model for former al Shabaab members as well. 
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Appendix: Pre and Post Testing Instruments. 
Paragraph Completion Test 
1. When I think about MY community (group) (see A, above)… (fill in the 
large blank section) 
 
2. When I think about the OTHER group (see B, above)… (fill in the 
large blank section) 
 
SIP Scale (Scale 1 - 5; Strongly Agree = 5, Strongly Disagree = 1; items 
balanced for order effects Pre and Post) 
 
a. My group often has to do what other more powerful groups want 
b. My group is often treated unfairly by more powerful groups 
c. Members of my group are easily accepted into influential or powerful 
groups in Kenya 
d. My group deserves to have a stronger position 
e. The strength of my group is increasing 
 
Conflict Scenarios Questionnaire 
Pre test 
Scenario 1: 
You are walking down the street at night in Eastleigh and someone you don’t 
like is on the other side of the street, walking towards you.  You are alone.  He 
is with a couple of other men.  They are talking about you and looking in your 
direction.  They get louder and shout insults at you.  You can tell he is trying 
to get a reaction out of you.  He and the other men are laughing.  What do you 
do?  
 
For each scenario, 5 options.  Rank each option according to whether you 
would or would not react this way. (Scale 1 – 5; 1 = Yes, I would do this for 
sure, 5 = No, I would never do this) 
 
a. You look the other way (like, into a shop window) and hope they’ll 
keep walking past you.  Your goal is to avoid the situation and forget 
about it.  
b. You cross the street and confront them.  They’re being foolish and a 
pain. You tell them to stop now.  Your goal is to solve the problem by 
being as direct as possible. 
c. You cross the street smiling, asking how they’re doing.  You want to be 
friends, not make a big deal of it.  Your goal is to keep the peace and 
the relationship at all costs.  
d. You go up to them, smiling a little.  You say, ‘Yeah, that was a good 
joke — but I’m standing next to you, you don’t have to shout’.  You 
smile to break the tension.  Your goal is to break the hostility by 
surprising them with friendliness but at the same time telling them to 
stop shouting.  
e. You don’t like what they’re saying, and you let them know that, but 
you keep walking on.  They know that you could retaliate if you wanted 
to, but you don’t.  Your goal is to reach a compromise: everyone has 
freedom of expression – live and let live.  
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Scenario 2: 
You are waiting in line to get on a bus, and there is an argument between the 
bus driver, a Kenyan, and a passenger whom you know from your community. 
The bus driver is angry and is making the Somali get off the bus. You wonder 
what the Somali did wrong, and yet you also know that there is often unfair 
prejudice against Somalians. What do you do?  
 
a. You decide that you should calm the situation by asking your fellow 
Somali to make peace with the bus driver and to comply. 
b. You intervene straight away to confront the bullying bus driver; 
meanwhile you call your Somali friends who are in line for the bus to 
give you back up. 
c. You don’t want to inflame this trivial-looking situation, so you stay out 
of it.  You wander off to catch another bus.  
d. You speak to the bus driver in Swahili and ask him what the problem 
is.  Then you speak in Somali to the Somalian and ask him what the 
problem is.  You offer to help both parties get what they need, with 
neither losing face. 
e. You think that maybe the bus driver is inflating the cost of the ticket 
because the Somali has a lot of luggage, so you suggest that the Somali 
should pay just a little bit more for his ticket, but not the full price the 
bus driver is demanding. 
 
Conflict Scenarios Questionnaire 
Post test  
Scenario 1: 
It’s the Africa Nations Cup game, and Somalia is playing against _______ 
team (you decide which team this is). You are in a bus full of supporters of 
your team.  A bus from the rival team comes up alongside your bus. E veryone 
in both buses goes wild, shouting, pounding on the windows.  Then someone 
throws something at the rival team bus.  This is dangerous.  What do you do? 
 
a. You say to the person, “Hey,” throw something at me.  Whatever they 
throw at you, you then quietly pass it to someone else and say- pass it 
on.  Then you start passing something else.  Several things are now 
being passed around the bus in a friendly way.  
b. You roll down the window and tell the fans in the other bus they can 
throw something back at your bus.  
c. You sink down in your seat and close your eyes.  You don’t want 
anything to do with this. 
d. You say directly to the man in your bus who is throwing things and tell 
him to stop it.  Does he want to be responsible if the bus gets pulled 
over by the police? 
e. You put your arm around the man throwing things and tell him you 
don’t want him to get in trouble.  Looking around the bus, you say: 
We’re all friends and we stick together.  
 
Scenario 2: 
Walking home, you see some young kids from your neighborhood hanging out 
on the street.  You see them stopping another young kid – a youngster from 
another part of town, from a different background - and picking a fight with 
him.  What do you do? 
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a. You walk up to the kids and tell them to stop right now.  They should 
be ashamed of themselves.  They need to go home this instant.  
b. You walk past.  It’s none of your business.  Their parents should sort 
them out.  The kid will be okay. 
c. You say, ‘Hey, Kid (getting beaten up), what are you getting beaten up 
for?’  To the others you say: ‘Have a go at me!  Oh no, you don’t know 
what you’re doing, try this (showing them Aikido martial arts moves)!’  
d. You say, ‘Come on kids.  Say you’re sorry.  Shake hands.  You’re all 
friends now, right?  No one is hurt, right?  Go home’.  
e. You say, ‘Okay, now this guy who’s getting beaten up gets to have a 
punch at each of you.  Who’s first?’ 
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